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SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
Volume XLI 2008 Number 3
Bearing False Witness:
Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth Amendment
Stephen W. Gard'
"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. ,,2
I. INTRODUCTION
The "central value of the Fourth Amendment" is the protection of the
sanctity of the home from unjustifiable intrusion by law enforcement officials.3
It is settled law that before law enforcement officers may enter a home to
conduct a search or make an arrest they must, absent consent4 or exigent
circumstances, 5 first procure a valid warrant from a neutral and detached
magistrate.6 The entire beneficial nature of the warrant requirement, however,
rests upon the necessary assumption that in each case the law enforcement
officer's warrant application affidavit faithfully provides to the magistrate a
1. Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
2. Exodus 20:16 (King James).
3. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40
(2001); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E.D. of Mich.,
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
4. See, e.g, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (consent ovemdes Fourth Amendment
prohibition against warrantless searches); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1974) (stating
warrantless search valid when consent given by one who controls premises even if not defendant); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (holding search authorized by consent as valid).
5 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,392 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560 (2004); Steagald v. United States, 451 U S. 204, 214
(1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980). The Fourth Amendment requires a valid warrant in
a limited number of situations outside the context of residential dwellings. See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358-59 (1977) (searching private office); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (using electronic interception of telephone communications); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-
52 (1951) (searching hotel room). The discussion herein applies to all warrant-based searches and arrests,
although particularly focuses on residential searches.
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truthful rendition of the underlying facts and circumstances necessary for an
independent judicial determination. The Fourth Amendment "is no barrier at
all if it can be evaded by a policeman concocting a story that he feeds a
magistrate."
7
Cases presenting the issue of allegedly falsified warrant affidavits arise
routinely in the lower courts throughout the United States. The United States
Supreme Court, however, has not addressed the issue in almost thirty years.
The Court not only left many important doctrinal questions unanswered in its
1978 decision in Franks v. Delaware,8 but no scholarly examination of the
problem of police perjury in warrant affidavits has since occurred. 9 This
absence of guidance for lower courts is especially acute because Franks
predates both the Supreme Court's revolutionary reinterpretation of the Fourth
Amendment1 ° and the development of most modem civil rights law. 1 Thus, it
is not surprising that lower courts have been unable to formulate coherent and
consistent legal standards in this important area of the law. Unfortunately, the
only area where lower courts have been consistent exists in erecting
inappropriate barriers to the vindication of the serious wrongs perpetrated by
perjured warrant affidavits.
This Article addresses these important issues in both the criminal context of
motions to suppress and in the civil context of actions brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983." Part 1I discusses the prevalence of falsified warrant affidavits.
7. Baldwin v. Placer County, 418 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2005).
8. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
9. Since the Franks decision, there have been two articles which focus on warrant affidavits in a state
law criminal context. See generally, Edward Gregory Mascolo, Controverting an Informant's Factual Basis
for a Search Warrant Franks v. Delaware Revisited and Rejected Under Connecticut Law, 15 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 65 (1995); Peter William Mickelson, Comment Good Riddance to Good Faith?: Deciphering Montana's
New Test for Subfacial Challenges to Search Warrant Affidavits, 62 MONT. L. REV. 175 (2001). A few articles
on the topic, again from a criminal procedure perspective, were published prior to the Franks decision. See
generally, e.g, Joseph D. Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel- Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the
Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L. REV. 405 (1971); Lawrence Herman, Warrants for Arrest or
Search Impeaching the Allegations of a Facially Sufficient Affidavit, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 721 (1975); Charles M.
Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, II SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839 (1974). Until now, the problem
of false warrant applications has never been addressed in the context of civ rights actions brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
10. Most significantly, Franks pre-dates Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which now governs the
determination of whether a warrant affidavit sufficiently establishes probable cause for a search or arreSt. See
generally Louis D. Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the Lessons of Reading Criminal
Justice as Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979 (2005)..
I1. The Supreme Court decided virtually all major cases interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after Franks. See
generally, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Malley v. Bnggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). But see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
806 (1961) (unleashing full potential of § 1983 lawsuits).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depnvation of any rights, privileges, or
[Vol. XLI:445
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Part Ill explains how such police perjury strikes at the very heart of the
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures that the warrant clause
of the Fourth Amendment provides. Part IV explains the Supreme Court's
holding in Franks and identifies the many questions left unanswered by the
majority opinion. Parts V, VI, and VII articulate the proper legal doctrines to
govern cases of allegedly falsified warrant affidavits and explain why the
barriers erected by the lower courts are unjustifiable. This Article concludes
that allegations of perjurious warrant affidavits present pure issues of fact to be
resolved by the trier of fact. If the trier of fact determines that one or more
perjured statements in the warrant affidavit caused the search or arrest, then the
Fourth Amendment has been violated, entitling the victim to relief without the
necessity of surmounting any additional legal barriers.
11. THE PROBLEM OF FALSIFIED WARRANT AFFIDAVITS
Legal scholars have generally assumed, with no empirical foundation, that
law enforcement officers so rarely file perjured warrant affidavits that the issue
is unworthy of concern. Indeed, to the extent the issue has been discussed at
all, scholars have concluded that the warrant requirement itself operates as an
effective deterrent to such police perjury.13 Scholars of the Fourth Amendment
generally advance the argument that law enforcement officers not only have
less incentive to lie in a warrant affidavit, but also that it is more difficult for
them to do so because they file the warrant affidavit prior to conducting the
search.' 4  At that stage, officers are unaware of whether the search will be
successful in discovering the sought-after contraband or other evidence of
illegality. Scholars bolster this argument with the assertion that a magistrate is
more likely to uncover police perjury when deciding whether to issue a warrant
than a judge, ruling on a motion to suppress after the occurrence of the search.15
The assumption that police perjury in warrant affidavits is rare and
effectively deterred by the warrant application process is counter-intuitive and
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
13. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J 1311, 1347 (1994); Carol S. Steiker,
Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 853-54 (1994); William J. Stuntz, Warrants
and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 915 (1991) [hereinafter Stuntz, Renedies].
14 See, e.g, Craig M. Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases- Reasonable Exercise in Futility, 60
IND. L.J. 287, 292 (1985); Steiker, supra note 13, at 854; Stuntz, Remedies, supra note 13, at 915.
15. See Stuntz, Remedies, supra note 13, at 915. The larger argument made by Professor Stuntz, that the
warrant requirement disproportionately protects upper and middle class Americans, is contradicted by the
empirical reality that the poor (except for the truly homeless) are targeted disproportionately by law
enforcement officers for warrant-based residential searches. Compare William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of
Fourth Amiendnent Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265 (1999) [hereinafter Stuntz, Privacy] (discussing
Fourth Amendment law's effects on police targeting minority and poorer neighborhoods), with Laurence A.
Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183 (2002) (statistics
indicate police over-target minorities in warrant-based home searches in San Diego).
20081
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contradicted by all available evidence. Inasmuch as lies and deception are an
acceptable feature of much routine law enforcement activity, 16 it should come
as no surprise that scholars have found that law enforcement officers frequently
lie to their own superiors in police reports 7 and even perjure themselves in
testimony at criminal trials. 18 The general consensus among scholars notes the
pervasiveness of police perjury at suppression hearings. 19 Indeed, substantial
evidence demonstrates that police perjury is so common that scholars describe
it as a "subcultural norm rather than an individual aberration. ' 2° There is no
reason to believe that police perjury does not also present a serious problem in
warrant affidavits. In fact, many of the same empirical investigations upon
which scholars base their conclusion that police perjury constitutes a serious
problem in these other contexts also document widespread perjury by law
enforcement officers in warrant affidavits.2'
16 See generally GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (1988); Katherine
Goldwasser, After ABSCAM: An examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit Targeting Discretion in
Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75 (1987); Richard A. Leo & Welsh S White, Adapting to
Miranda: Modern Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 397 (1999) (explaining undercover investigations and sting operations rely on falsehoods and deception
for success); see also Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil, Police Lying in Interrogation, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425,
427-29 (1996) (describing how lies and deceit have replaced physical coercion as proper interrogation
practice).
17. See Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am " Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in
Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1993); see also Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes. Road
Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 678-79 (2002).
18. See Michael Goldsmith, Reforming the Civil Rights Act of 1871: The Problem of Police Perjury, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1259, 1266 (2005) (noting widespread anecdotal evidence of police perjury during
suppression hearings).
19. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS 49-64 (1996); Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells,
The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie. A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U.
PITT. L. REv. 233, 246 (1998); Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying, " and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1341, 1355-56 (1996) [hereinafter Cloud, Testilying]; David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police
Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455 (1999); Donald A. Dripps, Police. Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1996); Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance
Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 398 (1999); Myron W. Orfield, Jr, Deterrence,
Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
75, 97 (1992); Christopher Slobogm, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery. Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L.
REV. 775 (1997). See generally JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973); H. RICHARD UVILLER.
TEMPERED ZEAL (1988).
20. Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, I CRLM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1982, at 40, 42-43,
available at http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/cje/htmI/samplel.html; see also Chin & Wells, supra note 19, at 246;
Carl B. Klockars, Blue Lies and Police Placebos. The Moralities of Police Lying, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 529,
543 (1984).
21 See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE FBI LABORATORY:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND
OTHER CASES (1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9704a/index.htm; NEW YORK (N.Y.), CITY
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAKING THE US VS. THEM BARRIER: A REPORT ON POLICE/COMMUNITY
RELATIONS (1993); THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPT., COMMISSION REPORT:
ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS (1994), available at
http://www.parc.info/clientfiles/Special%/20Reports/4%/20- / 2OMollen%/o20Commission%/ 20-/o20NYPD.pdf;
[Vol. XLI:445
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The disturbing ease with which one can find examples of falsified warrant
applications provides powerful evidence of the serious problem of police
perjury in our society. In 2002, the United States Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) reported that in September of 2000, the federal
government admitted to "misstatements and omissions of material acts" in "75
FISA applications related to major terrorist attacks directed against the United
States. ' '22 As a result, the court refused to accept inaccurate affidavits from FBI
agents and even prohibited one FBI agent from appearing before the court as a
FISA affiant.23  Six months later, in March 2001, the federal government
admitted to "similar misstatements in another series of FISA applications."
2 4
More disturbing is the Justice Department's apparent lack of interest in the
punishment of the FBI agents or the prevention of similar future occurrences.
The FISC noted that:
These incidents have been under investigation by the FBI's and the Justice
Department's Offices of Professional Responsibility for more than one year to
determine how the violations occurred in the field offices, and how the
misinformation found its way into the FISA applications and remained
uncorrected for more than one year despite procedures to verify the accuracy of
FISA pleadings. As of this date, no report has been published, and how these
misinterpretations occurred remains unexplained to the Court.
25
In 2001, the FBI undertook "Operation Candyman," one of the largest
investigations into the internet distribution of child pornography. The
operation's efforts were jeopardized upon discovery that the sworn affidavits of
an FBI Special Agent, filed in support of numerous applications to search the
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T (1991), available at
http://www parc.info/client-files/Special%20Reports/l%20-%2OChistopher%2OCommision.pdf; COMMISSION
TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE CITY'S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, THE
KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION (1972); UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A
REPORT (1967); ESTES KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1968); U.S. WICKERSHAM COMMISSION REPORTS, U.S
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: REPORT ON POLICE VOL. 14 (1931);
REPORT AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK VOL. V (1895). In addition, widespread perjury by police officers in Atlanta,
Detroit, DuPage County, Illinois, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York City, upstate New York,
and Philadelphia has been reported. See Chin & Wells, supra note 19, at 234-35 nn.4 & II (sources omitted).
22. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620
(FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
23. ld at 621.
24. Id.
25. Id. FBI agents have also filed affidavits, which included intentionally or recklessly false statements of
fact, in support of "material witness" arrests and search warrants related to the war on terror. See Ricardo J.
Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until Cleared ": Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the
Wake of the September 1 Ith Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 678-80, 720-25 (2005).
2008]
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suspects' residences, contained knowingly false statements of purported fact.
2 6
Similarly, subsequent evidence revealed that the warrant authorizing the
search of the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas, which resulted in
a law enforcement disaster and the death of several innocent children, was
based on an affidavit containing many falsehoods. 27 Search and arrest warrants
and the resulting criminal prosecution for federal gun crimes are routinely
based on the purported accuracy of the information contained in the National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, maintained by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The head of the National Firearms Act
branch of the Bureau has stated, "When we testify in court, we testify that the
database is one hundred percent accurate. That's what we testify to, and we
will always testify to that. As you probably well know, that may not be one
hundred percent true.82s  Abundant examples of law enforcement officers
falsifying statements of their own observations in warrant affidavits also
exist.29 One such example is the well-documented common practice of police
officers including fictitious statements from nonexistent confidential
informants in warrant affidavits. 30 Even when a confidential informant actually
exists, law enforcement officers frequently falsify statements in the warrant
26. See generally Francis A. Cavanagh, Comment, Probable Cause in a World of Pure Imagination. Why
the Candvman Warrants Should Not Have Been Golden Tickets to Search, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1091 (2006),
see also United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of
the defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that the remaining content of the affidavits, after the court
redacted the perjured statement, sufficiently established probable cause for the search. Martin, 426 F.3d at 73.
Judge Pooler's dissenting opinion questioned the dubious character of the majority's reasoning. Id. at 79
(Pooler, J., dissenting).
27 See David B. Kopel & Paul H. Blackman, The Unwarranted Warrant The Waco Search Warrant and the
Decline of the Fourth Amendment, 18 HAMLINE J PUB. L. & POL'Y I, 8-9 (1996).
28 Kopel & Blackman, supra note 27, at 8-9. In truth, the accuracy of this database has been as low as fifty
percent. Id. at 9. Law enforcement officers also routinely present the results of DNA testing, fingerprint
analysis, and other laboratory procedures as entirely accurate in affidavits for search and arrest warrants despite
their actual knowledge that the reliability and integrity of the crime laboratories are open to serious doubt. See.
e.g, J. Herbie Difonzo, The Crimes of Crime Labs, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2005); Laurel P. Gorman,
Comment, The Brady Solution" A Due Process Remedy for Those Convicted with Evidence from Faulty Crime
Labs, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 725, 728-29 (2005).
29. See generally, e g, United States v Martin, 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v Mick, 263
F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2001); Sythe v City of Eureka, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (N.D. Cal. 1999). One of the most
notorious examples of this type of police perjury occurred in the O.J. Simpson murder case, in which the judge
found that the affidavit for the search of the Simpson residence contained numerous falsehoods made in
reckless disregard of the truth. See Cloud, Testilying, supra note 19, at 1357-61 & n.90; Christopher Slobogin,
Testilying. Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1037-39 (1996).
30 See generally Commonwealth v. Lewin, 542 N.E.2d 275 (Mass. 1989) (detailing perjurious
statements of the Boston Drug Control Unit); Larry Wentworth, Comment, The XYZ Affair of Massachusetts
Prosecutorial Misconduct. The Curious Case of Commonwealth v. Lewin-Was Dismissal Warranted?, 25
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1019 (1991). The practice of law enforcement officers using imaginary informants is not
limited to Boston, Massachusetts. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 293 n.3 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting problem in Illinois); Riley v. City of Montgomery, 104 F.3d 1247, 1250 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (detailing
state investigation revealing Montgomery Police knowingly relying on false information from informants);
McClurg, supra note 19, at 401-02 & n.71 (discussing prevalence of problem in New York).
HeinOnline  -- 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 450 2007-2008
PERJURED AFFIDA VITS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
affidavit regarding the informant's reliability or credibility. 3 1
Police perjury in warrant affidavits thus constitutes a serious problem.
Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, the warrant application process is entirely
unsuited to the discovery of false statements in warrant affidavits.3 2  The
magistrate conducts the warrant application ex parte and rarely questions the
police officer about the content of the affidavit. In any event, the magistrate
lacks the investigative resources to verify the truthfulness of the statements in
the officer's affidavit. 33 Additionally, because the law enforcement officer who
signs the warrant affidavit oftentimes simply relays information learned from
another officer,34 the warrant affidavit may consist entirely of hearsay.35  In
such cases, the supposed ability of the magistrate to judge the credibility of the
affiant becomes an ineffective safeguard. Even when a search is based on a
warrant, the first opportunity the criminal process affords the defendant to
challenge the factual basis for the search occurs at an after-the-fact suppression
hearing. At that time, the magistrate's prior issuance of a warrant generally
creates "a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the
search warrant. ' 36 Thus, a warrant-based search is generally less vulnerable to
challenge than a warrantless search.
The Founding Fathers crafted the Fourth Amendment in direct response to
"the harsh experience of householders having their doors hammered open by
magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown." 37 Today, the warrant clause
of that amendment is the only safeguard that exists to prevent arbitrary and
unjustified governmental intrusions into the sanctity of the home. The efficacy
of that protection, in turn, depends entirely upon the truthfulness of the
underlying affidavit sworn to by the police officer. Perjured affidavits filed by
31 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 298 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Allen, 297 F.3d
790, 795 (8th Cir. 2002) (detailing allegations of omitting criminal history and drug addiction of informant);
United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565, 573 (1 st Cir. 1999) (holding as material error omission of informant's
criminal history from affidavit); United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1553 (9th Cir. 1995) (reasoning FBI
misled court by omitting informant's criminal history). In Brown, for example, the FBI agent swore in the
affidavit that "[slince his cooperation with the FBI [the informant] has never been known to provide false or
misleading information." Brown, 298 F.3d at 396. In fact, the FBI agent knew that the informant was
"thoroughly dishonest." Id. at 409. Moreover, the Assistant U.S. Attorney who filed the affidavit testified in a
contemporaneous legal proceeding that "the things that we're not able to independently corroborate, we believe
are lies." Id. at 397.
32. See supra notes 13, 15 and accompanying text (detailing conventional wisdom among scholars).
33. See generally Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1987).
34 See, eg, United States v. Davis, 471 U.S. 938, 946-47 & n.6 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v
Whitley, 249 F.3d 614, 616-18 (7th Cir. 2001), United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (10th Cir.
1997).
35. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241-42 (1983); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269
(1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U S. 307, 313-14 (1959).
36. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)
37. William J. Cuddihy & B. Cannon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle. Origins of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 372 (1980).
2008]
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law enforcement officers thus strike at the very heart of the Fourth
Amendment.
III. THE ERODING EFFECTS OF PERJURY ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment requires that, in order to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, a warrant must: (1) be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate;
(2) set forth under oath or affirmation facts sufficient to establish probable
cause; and (3) particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
38things to be seized. Perjurious warrant affidavits defeat each of the three
requirements imposed by the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. 3
9
Probable cause for a search warrant exists "where the known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found" in the particular
place for which the warrant is sought.40 In each case, an assessment of
probable cause requires the consideration of two necessary elements: (1) the
totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case; and (2) whether
these facts and circumstances are sufficient to constitute probable cause.41
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the foundation of the
probable cause analysis is "the known facts and circumstances," this somewhat
misleading statement creates a misperception of objectivity.42  A police
officer's assertions in a warrant affidavit are ordinarily based upon "hearsay
and upon information received from informants, as well as upon information
within the affiant's own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily.'A3
38. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 556 (2004) (detailing what warrant clause necessitates). In
its entirety, the Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
39. The Fourth Amendment particularity requirement relates to and buttresses the probable cause
requirement because it too is intended to prevent "the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of
fact." Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). Therefore, the discussion herein of
the effect of perjurious warrant affidavits on the probable cause requirement is equally applicable to the
particularity requirement. In addition, another purpose of the particularity requirement is to limit the scope and
intensity of the execution of the warrant. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979);
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,480 (1976); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). Perjured
warrant affidavits similarly defeat this purpose of the particulanty requirement.
40. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); see also United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95
(2006); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
41 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (abandoning two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of totality of
circumstances test for determining probable cause in confidential informant situations).
42. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696; see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
43. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978). It is clearly established law that probable cause may
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Moreover, the significance of the information in the warrant affidavit, which
itself may be entirely innocent,44 often depends upon the assertion and
characterization of background "facts and circumstances" by the law
enforcement officer.45  In short, the Fourth Amendment does not require that
"every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct;" rather,
merely that the officer's assertions therein "be 'truthful' in the sense that the
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as
true. 46 Therefore, probable cause is not necessarily based on actual reality but
on the factual nature of the law enforcement affiant's state of mind and
veracity. Intentionally or recklessly false statements in warrant affidavits by
police officers strip the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause of its value.
47
The purpose of the probable cause requirement is to ensure that residential
searches and seizures are constitutionally permissible only when based on
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing created by the actions of the home's
occupant.48  Unless one engages in the implausible assumption that the law
enforcement officer acts without purpose, the officer's necessary intent behind
an intentionally or recklessly false statement in a warrant affidavit is to
manufacture probable cause or particularity where none actually exists.
When the focus is shifted from the reporting of the facts and circumstances
in sworn affidavits filed by law enforcement officers to the determination of
whether those facts and circumstances sufficiently establish probable cause, it
becomes apparent that perjured warrant affidavits strike at the very heart of the
Fourth Amendment warrant clause. The central purpose of the warrant clause
is to prevent unjustifiable governmental intrusions into the sanctity of the
home, not merely to deter or punish such intrusions after the fact. 4 9  The
be based on hearsay. See, eg, Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960);
Draper, 358 U.S. at 312-13.
44 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13.
45. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699-700. "For example, what may not amount to reasonable suspicion [or
probable cause] at a motel located alongside a transcontinental highway at the height of the summer tourist
season may rise to that level in December in Milwaukee." Id.
46. Franks. 438 U.S. at 165. In contrast, no requirement exists mandating that the law enforcement
official subjectively believe that the facts, truthfully recounted, are sufficient to constitute probable cause.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983). The probable cause standard is objective and depends upon the
conclusion of an ordinary reasonable and prudent person. See e.g, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964);
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76.
47. As used herein, an affidavit statement is intentionally or recklessly false if it is perjurious in character,
which in turn is defined as a statement which the affiant did not believe or appropriately accept as being true.
48. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness
of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 533-37 (1995); David A. Harris, Using Race Or Ethnicity
as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No,
73 Miss L.J. 423, 438-42 (2003); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1766-68 (1994).
49. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MiCH. L. REV. 547, 576-77,
589 (1999). It is impossible to assess the effectiveness of the warrant clause in preventing unjustified searches
and seizures. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) ("The probable-cause standard is incapable of
precise definition or quantification into percentages .. "). A recent study of the success rate of warrant-based
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distinctive means chosen by the Founding Fathers to achieve this purpose is the
requirement of ex ante review of the necessity and scope of the proposed police
action by an independent decision-maker. 50  To ignore the magistrate
requirement wrongly conflates warrant-based searches and seizures with
warrantless searches and seizures, thereby writing the warrant clause out of the
Fourth Amendment. Precisely for this reason, the United States Supreme Court
has uniformly held that a search or seizure inside a home, even if based on
probable cause and executed with particularity, violates the Fourth Amendment
absent a valid warrant issued ex ante by a neutral and detached magistrate. 51 In
contrast, courts will deem a residential search or arrest conducted pursuant to a
warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate constitutional even in the
absence of actual probable cause and particularity. 52 Thus, the examination of
the constitutional significance of intentionally or recklessly false statements in
warrant affidavits must concentrate on the magistrate requirement of the Fourth
Amendment for the simple reason that "[t]he search of a private dwelling
without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws."
53
A. Perjury and the "Neutral and Detached" Magistrate
The magistrate requirement of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment
is a separation of powers provision, which turns on the nature of the person
narcotics searches, conducted in the San Diego Judicial District, found that the success rates of warrant-based
searches for methamphetamine was sixty-three percent and twenty-eight percent for rock cocaine. Benner,
supra note 15, at 205 tbl.16. When the target of the warrant-based search is African-American or Hispanic the
success rate declines precipitously. Benner, supra note 15, at 204-05 tbls. 13, 14, 15. Perjured warrant
affidavits surely increase the rate of unsuccessful searches
50 See, e.g., United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006) ("The Constitution protects property
owners ... by interposing, ex ante, the 'deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... between the
citizen and the police."' (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963))); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) ("[T]he procedure of antecedent justification. . is central to the Fourth
Amendment"); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U S. 699, 709-10 (1948). The Supreme Court has noted the
deep historical roots of the warrant clause's requirement of ex ante authorization by a magistrate. Quoting
Lord Mansfield, the Court wrote, "It is not fit that the receiving or judging of the information should be left to
the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain directions to the officer."
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (quoting Leach v. Three of
the King's Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765)).
51 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558-63 (2004); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88
(1980); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925).
52. See Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) ("[So long as the magistrate had a 'substantial basis
for... [concluding]' that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no
more." (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960))). In actual practice, a warrant-based search
lacking even a "substantial basis" for finding probable cause ordinarily will be insulated from any remedy
provided that the police officer acted in "good faith" See generally Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981
(1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986)
(qualified immunity standard mirrors Leon "good faith" standard).
53. Agnello, 269 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)
(noting a warrantless search of the home unconstitutional with few exceptions).
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making the judgment, whether or not the requested warrant should be issued.54
An individual must be truly impartial and independent to qualify as a "neutral
and detached magistrate." 55  A police officer, prosecutor, or anyone else
actively involved in the investigation of the alleged criminal activity lacks the
requisite independence and impartiality necessary to serve as a magistrate.
56
"Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear that they
require severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement."
57
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the very
purpose of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is to mandate that the
decision whether a residential search or seizure is justifiable must be made by a
neutral and detached magistrate and not a law enforcement officer:
The informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue
warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the
Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others
who may happen to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more
likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the
caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement that
attends the capture of persons accused of crime.
58
Perjurious statements in warrant affidavits by law enforcement officers
deprive magistrates of the accurate information necessary to exercise their
informed judgment and thereby impermissibly substitute the police officer for
the magistrate as the actual decision-maker in the warrant issuance process.59
The Supreme Court noted this intent of the warrant clause: "The right of
privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of [law
enforcement officials]. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the
police acting on their own cannot be trusted. 6 °
54. See. e.g., Malley, 475 U.S. at 352 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); U.S Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. at 316-17; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455-56 (1948).
55. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 381 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Whiteley v.
Warden, 401 U S. 560, 564 (1971); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
56 See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979) (town justice stepped outside role
of neutral and detached magistrate when he led search party and conducted search of store); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (probable cause determination for warrant made by state Attorney
General, who later prosecuted the case); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1968) (subpoena duces
tecum for documents in office issued by New York District Attorney not a valid search under Fourth
Amendment).
57. Shadwick v City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972); see also United States v. U.S Dist. Court for
the E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
58. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452. 464 (1932); see also Coohdge, 403 U.S. at 450; Johnson,
333 U.S. at 13-14.
59. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U S. 102, 108-
09 (1965); Wong Sun, 371 U S. at 481-82.
60. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
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It is violative of the most fundamental values of the Fourth Amendment for
the magistrate to act as a mere "rubber stamp" for warrant decisions actually
made by law enforcement officers. 6 1  For this reason, the United States
Supreme Court has consistently held that a valid warrant cannot be based on an
affidavit which contains only the beliefs, suspicions, or conclusions of a police
officer. 62 "Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow
that official to determine probable cause."
63
Other bedrock Fourth Amendment principles serve to guarantee that the
independent and detached magistrate, rather than a law enforcement officer,
makes the assessment of whether the underlying facts and circumstances
sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus, neither a search nor a seizure may
be justified on the basis of information learned as a result of the search or
seizure or any other after-acquired knowledge. 64 An essential corollary to this
principle is the established doctrine that "an otherwise insufficient affidavit
cannot be rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed by the
affiant when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing
magistrate. ' 65 Absent stringent judicial enforcement of this "four corners" rule,
the warrant clause would be rendered meaningless with search and arrest
warrants issued not on the basis of the independent and informed judgment of
the magistrate, but instead on the unreviewed discretion of law enforcement
officers. The police would indirectly be empowered to perform that which the
Constitution prohibits if done directly-conduct residential searches and seizures
without a valid warrant issued by a magistrate with knowledge of the
underlying information believed to justify the invasion. In such cases, "the
provisions of the Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases and the
61. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108-09 (stating magistrate must look at underlying circumstances upon which
affiant bases his or her belief that probable cause exists).
62. See, e.g, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 1081, 112-13 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,
486 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41,47 (1933).
63. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)),
see also Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112-13.
64. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (search predicated on anonymous tip with no basis
of knowledge invalid even though information suspect earned gun proved true); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963) (officer's entry into home upon invalid search warrant not righted by suspect's
suspicious flight from officer); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) ("[A] search is not to be made
legal by what turns up").
65. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971); see also Aguilar, 378
U.S. at 109 n.1; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). Thus, only that information properly
presented to the magistrate, either in the sworn affidavit or in verbal testimony given under oath, may be
considered. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109 n.I (noting fact that police conducted surveillance was irrelevant
because officers failed to mention to magistrate when applying for warrant). In a few States, a magistrate, in
making his probable cause determination, may consider only that contained in the written affidavit as a result of
statute or rule. See generally Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (explaining under
Pennsylvania State Constitution, no "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule exists as under Fourth
Amendment of Federal Constitution).
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protections it affords largely nullified.,
66
In short, a law enforcement officer who files a warrant affidavit that contains
intentionally or recklessly false statements of fact usurps the constitutionally
mandated role of the magistrate. The officer deprives the magistrate of the
truthful information necessary to make an independent and informed decision
regarding probable cause. The nature of the assessment of whether probable
cause exists further emphasizes the harm done to the targets of such police
intrusions, many of whom are entirely innocent, and to the Fourth Amendment
itself.
67
B. Perjury and Probable Cause
"Articulating precisely what... 'probable cause' mean[s] is not possible." 68
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "probable cause is a
fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."
69
The magistrate acts as an ordinary, reasonably prudent and cautious person
when making the determination whether the facts, as presented in the affidavit,
are sufficient to constitute probable cause. She merely makes a reasonable
factual prediction that the object of the search will be found at the targeted
location. 70 The Supreme Court recognizes that "the probable-cause standard is
a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical
consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.'71 The magistrate acts not as a legally trained jurist because
"many warrants are-quite properly-issued on the basis of nontechnical,
common-sense judgments of laymen." 72 Indeed, the lay magistrate makes not
only the initial, but essentially the final, assessment of whether the facts are
sufficient to constitute probable cause because the "standard for review of an
issuing magistrate's probable cause determination . . .[is] that so long as the
magistrate had a substantial basis for. . . conclud[ing] that a search would
uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more."
73
66. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958).
67. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
68. Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-
71 (2003); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
69. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232; see also Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71; Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696.
70. See Untted States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) ("Because the probable-cause requirement looks
to whether evidence will be found when the search is conducted, all warrants are, in a sense, 'anticipatory"').
71. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); see also Ornelas, 517 U.S at 695; Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
72. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36 (citation omitted); see also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350
(1972).
73. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)); cf Ornelas, 517
U.S. at 698-99 (creating a dual standard of review). Ornelas imposed a de novo standard of review on appeals
from probable cause determinations made in suppression hearings involving warrantless searches and seizures,
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Even with this extremely deferential standard of review, however, established
legal doctrine provides that a magistrate's finding of probable cause, later
found to have been based on a perjured affidavit, receives no deference, and
thereby demonstrates the gravity of the harm caused by warrant affidavits
containing intentionally or recklessly false statements.74
"The essential protection of the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment . . is in 'requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.' ' 75 Perjurious warrant affidavits contravene
this crucial Fourth Amendment principle of an independent ex ante assessment
of the existence of probable cause by a truthfully informed neutral and detached
magistrate. 76  In many cases, the harm caused by the Fourth Amendment
violation can never be undone since it is impossible to know for certain what a
truthfully informed magistrate would have decided at that moment in history.
This is especially true because "[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on
the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause. 77
IV. THE FRANKS DECISION
The United States Supreme Court directly confronted the issue of perjurious
statements in search warrant affidavits only once, in the 1978 case of Franks v.
Delaware.78 In Franks, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide the limited question: "Does a defendant in a criminal proceeding ever
have the right, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments subsequent to the
ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to challenge the truthfulness of factual
statements made in an affidavit supporting the warrant. ' 79 All but one of the
federal circuit courts of appeals had already answered this question
affirmatively.80 The courts of appeals then proceeded to consider the separate
and distinct issue of the circumstances under which such a challenge to the
veracity of a warrant affidavit could be made by a criminal defendant in a
and at the same time, reaffirmed that lower courts should uphold magistrates' determinations whether warrants
should issue if a substantial basis exists Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 704-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
majority's dual standard of review). Even appeals from probable cause determinations made in suppression
hearings, involving warrantless searches and seizures, are reviewable only for clear error and deference must be
given to the inferences drawn by the trial court judge. Id. at 699 (majority opinion).
74. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 923 (1984).
75. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983) (quoting Johnson v. United, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
76 See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2006); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 582
(1980); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E.D of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972).
77. Leon, 468 U.S at 914.
78. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
79. Id at 155 (emphasis added).
80 See id. at 160. A clear majority of the state courts which had addressed the issue also permitted such
veracity challenges to warrant applications. Id. at 159 n.3, 176-80.
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subsequent suppression hearing. This latter question of when, as opposed to
whether, a successful challenge could be made seriously divided the federal
circuit courts of appeals.
8 1
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, resolved the pure Fourth
Amendment issue upon which the Court granted certiorari with dispatch,
reasoning simply, "Because it is the magistrate who must determine
independently whether there is probable cause[,] ... it would be an unthinkable
imposition upon his authority if a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to
contain a deliberately or reckless false statement, were to stand beyond
impeachment."82 Justice Blackmun then quickly diverted attention away from
the Fourth Amendment question presented by subtly restating the issue:
"[w]hether the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments, and the derivative
exclusionary rule ... ever mandate that a defendant be permitted to attack the
veracity of a warrant affidavit after the warrant has been issued and
executed.,
8 3
This shift in concern, from the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment to the exclusionary rule and the
criminal justice process of adjudicating the guilt or innocence of persons
accused of committing criminal acts, was understandable given the facts of
Franks. Jerome Franks became the prime suspect in a rape case when he made
an incriminating statement while in custody for allegedly assaulting another
female.84 Thereafter, the two police officers investigating the matter submitted
a sworn affidavit to a Justice of the Peace in support of an application for a
warrant to search Franks's apartment. This affidavit included the statement that
"your affiant contacted Mr. James Williams and Mr. Wesley Lucas... where
Jerome Franks is employed and did have personal conversation with both these
people" and that each of them "revealed to your affiant that the normal dress of
Jerome Franks" matched the description given by the victim.85 The Justice of
the Peace issued the warrant, and as a result of the search, police seized
clothing and a knife fitting a description provided by the victim.86 Franks's
81 Compare United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding warrant invalidated
only if false statement was both intentional and "non-trivial" to the issue of probable cause), and United States
v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1973) (false statement made with "intent to deceive the magistrate"
results in suppression without regard to materiality of the statement, but non-intentional falsehood invalidates
warrant only if material to probable cause), with Carmichael v. United States, 489 F.2d 983, 988-89 (7th Cir.
1973) (en banc) (invalidating warrants containing intentional falsehoods regardless of materiality or reckless
falsehoods, only if material; but stating negligent falsehoods would never invalidate the warrant), and United
States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1974) (same).
82 Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist for himself and Chief
Justice Burger, did not disagree with this fundamental interpretation of the warrant clause of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
84. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).
85 Id at 157, 174-76.
86. Id. at 157.
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defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the seized items and asserted,
without any supporting affidavits from the witnesses, that the warrant affidavit
contained false statements made in "bad faith" by the law enforcement
affiants. 87  Specifically, Franks's defense counsel asserted "that Lucas and
[Williams] would testify that neither had been personally interviewed by the
warrant affiants, and that.., any information given by them to [another] officer
was 'somewhat different' from what was recited in the affidavit." 88 The trial
court denied the motion to suppress, and Franks was convicted after the
prosecution introduced a knife into evidence to rebut Franks's sole defense that
the sexual relations had been consensual. 89 Thus, it is likely that the Court
viewed Franks as a case in which the defendant had a weak factual claim of a
Fourth Amendment violation while the evidence discovered in the challenged
search was central to the guilty verdict.
Moreover, by 1978, when the Supreme Court decided Franks, the Court was
seriously engaged in the enterprise of imposing limitations on the exclusionary
rule.90 Indeed, in their dissent, Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger used
the occasion of Franks to mount a frontal challenge on the very existence of the
exclusionary rule:
The warrant issued on impeachable testimony has, by hypothesis, turned up
incriminating and admissible evidence to be considered by the jury at the trial.
The fact that it was obtained by reason of an impeachable warrant bears not at
all on the innocence or guilt of the accused. The only conceivable harm done
by such evidence is to the accused's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which have nothing to do with his guilt or innocence of the crime
with which he is charged ....
Since once the warrant is issued and the search is made, the privacy interest
protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is breached, a subsequent
determination that it was wrongfully breached cannot possibly restore the
privacy interest.... [T]he only purpose served by suppression of such evidence
is deterrence of falsified testimony on the part of affiant in the future .... I
simply do not think the game is worth the candle in this situation.
91
The dissenting opinion's attack on the exclusionary rule was far more radical
87. Id. at 157-58.
88. Franks, 438 U.S. at 158. The affidavit made reference to James Williams; however, the officers
meant to have referenced James Morrison. Id. at 158 n.2.
89 Id. at 160, 162.
90. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (exclusionary rule not available on habeas
corpus); United States v. Jams 428 U.S. 433, 447, 454, 459-60 (1976) (exclusionary rule not available in civil
actions); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (same as to grand jury proceedings). The
process of restricting the exclusionary remedy continued, and in 1984, the Court adopted the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
91. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 184, 186 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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than the traditional criticism embodied in Justice (then Judge) Cardozo's
famous statement that the exclusionary rule permits "the criminal ... to go free
because the constable has blundered. ' '92  This latter criticism is entirely
misplaced in the case of perjurious warrant affidavits:
Cardozo's masterful imagery calls to mind a dull-witted but honest servant of
the law, floundering in a sea of emergent and sophisticated jurisprudential
choices while a crafty criminal squirms away through a constitutional
loophole .... But what do "blunders" have to do with perjurious affidavits...
deliberately employed to enlist the courts as "accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold?"
The Franks majority, after an extended discussion of the opposing
arguments, ultimately rejected the dissenters' challenge to the exclusionary rule
and adhered to the traditional doctrine that the rule should be applied where, as
in the case of perjured warrant affidavits, "the Fourth Amendment violation [is]
substantial and deliberate." 94  The majority nevertheless held that concerns
about the scope of the exclusionary rule and the practicalities of the criminal
process rendered the issue of perjurious warrant affidavits one of "competing
values that lead us to impose limitations" on the Fourth Amendment right.
95
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Franks stated cavalierly and in
"generalized language" the limitations which the Court deemed necessary by
the exclusionary rule and by the practicalities of the criminal justice process:
[W]e hold that, where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard
for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
alleged false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the
event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the
affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is
insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and
the fruits of the search excluded.
96
The superficial nature of the Court's holding is clear from its failure to even
acknowledge the conflicting decisions in the lower courts on some of these
92. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
93. People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130, 141 n.1 I (Cal. 1978) (en banc) (quoting United States ex reL. Petillo v.
New Jersey, 418 F Supp. 686, 689 n.4 (D. N.J. 1976)).
94. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
95. Id. at 165.
96 Id. at 155-56, 171-72.
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issues 9 7 and its uncritical reliance on tactical concessions made by counsel for
Franks at oral argument. 98  In the end, Franks left many critical issues
unresolved. The Court did not define what it meant by "a false statement
[made] knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. 99
The standard for determining when "the affidavit's remaining content is
insufficient to establish probable cause" also lacks clarity.10 0 Finally, the Court
never fully explicated the nature of the "substantial preliminary showing"
required by Franks.'0'
The lower courts, in the course of adjudicating numerous challenges against
allegedly perjurious warrant affidavits, have filled this vacuum with conflicting
and often unjustifiably restrictive decisions. In addition, many lower courts
have applied these unduly restrictive doctrines to civil rights actions brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the "competing values" relied upon by the
Supreme Court in Franks have no applicability.
10 2
V. THE TwIN BARRIERS OF SUBSTANTIAL PRELIMINARY SHOWING AND
INFORMANT PRIVILEGE
As interpreted by lower courts, the requirement of a substantial preliminary
showing prior to a Franks hearing, 103 as well as the government's privilege to
avoid disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant, 104 both operate as
significant barriers to the discovery and exposure of perjured warrant affidavits
in criminal cases. Thus, Professor Alschuler has concluded:
When a defense attorney can question neither the police officer who filed an
affidavit nor the unnamed informant described in the affidavit, he usually has
no way to determine whether the informant made the statements attributed to
him or even whether the informant existed. Unless perjurious police officers
lie in artless, obvious ways or attend religious meetings, repent their
misconduct, and confess their dishonesty to defense attorneys, Franks's
requirement of a substantial preliminary showing becomes an insurmountable
"Catch 22"-a defense attorney cannot develop the facts until he secures a
97. See supra note 81 (citing conflicting approaches of circuit courts of appeals).
98. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172 n.8 (1978). "[Franks] conceded that if what is left is sufficient
to sustain probable cause, the inaccuracies are irrelevant. [Franks] also conceded that if the warrant affiant had
no reason to believe the information was false, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id
(citations omitted).
99. Id. at 155.
100. Id. at 156.
101 Id. at 155.
102. Franks, 438 U.S. at 165.
103. See id. at 155-56, 171-72.
104. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313-14 (1967) (holding devoid of merit, petitioner's claim Sixth
Amendment rights violated by state's refusal to produce confidential informant).
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hearing and he cannot secure a hearing until he develops the facts.
10 5
Even in the context of a criminal defendant's motion to suppress, these two
legal doctrines, properly interpreted, should not impose insuperable obstacles to
meritorious Fourth Amendment claims. More importantly, neither the
requirement of a substantial preliminary hearing nor the government's
informant privilege has any basis in the Fourth Amendment itself. The
practical considerations upon which each doctrine is founded are unique to the
context of a motion to suppress in a criminal case and have no applicability in
civil actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A. The Substantial Preliminary Showing
In Franks, the Supreme Court set forth that a criminal defendant must
establish a substantial preliminary showing:
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than
conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-
examine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless
disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer
of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit
that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of
supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of
witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. 1
06
The Franks Court clearly intended for the substantial preliminary showing
requirement to act as a procedural mechanism to weed out frivolous claims
unworthy of evidentiary hearings, reserved for serious allegations of police
perjury in warrant affidavits.'0 7
The practical realities inherent in the criminal justice system create the need
for such a procedural device. Criminal defendants lose nothing by filing even
non-meritorious pre-trial motions because the criminal justice system fails to
provide any disincentive to the filing of frivolous Franks claims. Additionally,
the criminal justice system perversely encourages criminal defendants to file
such a claim in every case no matter how baseless the assertion. A criminal
defendant has no constitutional right to discovery of the prosecutor's evidence
in a criminal case, except to the very limited extent required by Brady v.
Maryland1° 8 and its progeny. 109  Therefore, some preliminary screening
105. Arthur W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government Work": The Exclusionary Rule After Leon,
1984 SUp. CT. REv. 309, 319 (1984).
106. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
107. See d. at 170.
108. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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mechanism is necessary to prevent criminal defense attorneys from routinely
filing a Franks motion in every case "as a convenient source of discovery,"
including the "revelation of the identity of informants."1 10
Many lower courts have elevated the substantial preliminary showing
requirement into a virtually insurmountable barrier by misconstruing the
requirement as an authorization to determine the factual merits of the criminal
defendant's claim before the evidentiary hearing mandated by Franks."1 ' The
very notion that a court may properly decide questions of fact before
conducting an evidentiary hearing is contrary to the American system of
justice. The only two arguments one could conceivably make to support this
position are entirely implausible. The first such argument seizes upon the
Court's statement in Franks that "[t]here is, of course, a presumption of validity
with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant." 112  It is clear,
however, from the Court's placement of this sentence-after its discussion of
the rationales for the preliminary showing requirement and immediately before
its exposition of the specifics of that requirement-that this "presumption of
validity" was simply a reason for the requirement itself and nothing more.
113
This conclusion also follows from the fact that the majority in Franks explicitly
required that courts determine the factual sufficiency of a challenge to the
truthfulness of a warrant affidavit at the evidentiary hearing. At such hearings,
the criminal defendant bears the burden of proof "by a preponderance of the
evidence.",
114
The second argument is even less convincing. It assumes that the Supreme
Court, by mandating the proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard at
the evidentiary hearing, requires a criminal defendant to prove the facts of his
claim by some lesser evidentiary standard as a prerequisite to entitlement to an
evidentiary hearing. 115 This argument is belied by the fact that the Supreme
Court in Franks did not suggest any lesser evidentiary standard of factual proof
109. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667. 682
(1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-07 (1976)
110. Franks, 438 U.S. at 167.
Ill. See infra note 116. In keeping with their interpretation of Franks as authorizing a factual evaluation
of the merits of the criminal defendant's claim of a perjured warrant affidavit, most lower courts review the
denial of a Franks evidentiary hearing under the clearly erroneous standard, appropriately reserved for
appellate review of lower court findings of fact. See, e.g., Zambrella v. United States, 327 F.3d 634, 638 (7th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Castillo, 287 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490,
505 (6th Cir. 2001). But see United States v. Brown, 298 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2002) (employing de novo
standard of review, alone among circuit courts of appeals).
112. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 155-56.
115. See People v. Lucente, 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1276-77 (I11. 1987) (holding substantial preliminary showing
somewhere between mere denials and proof by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Hamel, 634
A.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Me. 1993) (holding unwarranted requirement of criminal defendant to establish
preliminary showing by preponderance of the evidence); Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 617 N.E.2d 983, 987-88
(Mass. 1993) (adopting Lucente standard of substantial preliminary showing).
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for the preliminary showing and that no such lesser standard readily comes to
mind. Finally, it is revealing that the lower courts, which do make factual
determinations at the preliminary showing stage, never specify this lesser
standard of factual proof but instead merely conclude that the defendant failed
to meet the standard. 1
6
The majority opinion in Franks makes clear that the substantial preliminary
showing requirement is intended to measure the legal sufficiency of the
criminal defendant's allegations, not the factual question of whether the
defendant can prove these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence at an
evidentiary hearing. Precisely for this reason, the Supreme Court repeatedly
used the word "allegations" to describe the burden imposed upon criminal
defendants at the preliminary showing stage of the proceedings.
117
Some lower federal courts have unthinkingly transplanted the substantial
preliminary showing requirement to civil actions brought pursuant to § 1983.' 18
In doing so, these courts have ignored the fact that the rationales enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Franks have no applicability to civil actions because they
are based entirely on practical considerations unique to criminal cases. 119 In a
criminal case, the success of the search establishes some indicia of the
truthfulness of the warrant affidavit of the law enforcement officer. In contrast,
in a § 1983 action, where the search failed to uncover any contraband or other
evidence of criminal wrongdoing,120 the defendant police officer affiant should
116. See, eg., United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 688 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding alibi affidavits
insufficient to establish hearing where they failed to account for twenty-five minutes of seventy-two hour
period); United States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1990) (expert affidavit that declares affidavit
statement was scientifically "unlikely" held insufficient upon reasoning that some unlikely events probably do
occur); Johnson v. State, 472 N.E.2d 892, 902 (Ind. 1985) (informant's denial that he made statements
attributed to him in warrant affidavit insufficient because it "merely raises the question of credibility").
117. Franks, 438 U S. at 171. "[A]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient;" rather
they must be of deliberate or reckless falsehoods "accompanied by an offer of proof." Id.
118. See, e.g., Mason v. Lowndes County Sheriff's Dep't, 106 F. App'x 203, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2004);
Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509. 517 (6th Cir. 2003); Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2000).
119. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text (detailing purpose behind substantial preliminary
showing requirement in criminal justice system).
120. It is highly unlikely that a § 1983 action can be maintained if the search was successful because
preclusion doctrines ordinarily prohibit the re-litigation of issues decided favorably to the government in a
preliminary hearing, suppression hearing, or criminal trial. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-98,
103-04 (1980) (concluding Congress did not intend § 1983 "to restrict the normal doctrines of preclusion);
Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 417 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding defendant who plead guilty in state
criminal court cannot re-litigate elements of the crime in civil court); Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 235
(5th Cir. 1999) (ruling civil suit barred where litigation would call into question validity of criminal
conviction). In addition, most courts have held that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), would bar any
such § 1983 actions by a person convicted on the basis of evidence discovered in such a search unless or until
the conviction has been reversed or vacated on direct appeal or habeas corpus. See, e g., Snodderly v. R.U.F.F.
Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 899 (7th Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 suit barred if challenging the validity
of a search warrant while conviction still stands); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000)
(adopting approach of Second and Sixth Circuits barnng § 1983 suits for illegal searches until criminal charges
dismissed or overturned); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding plaintiff's
§ 1983 claim not time-barred if unable to bnng suit until conviction overturned because doing so would
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not receive any presumption of truthfulness. Thus, in a § 1983 civil action, the
individual plaintiff and the law enforcement defendant stand on an equal
footing before the court. 121  Furthermore, § 1983 plaintiffs do not have any
incentive to file non-meritorious actions, and they may not seek more discovery
than is expressly authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The substantial preliminary showing requirement has no place in civil §
1983 actions for another even more fundamental reason. If the requirement is
intended to serve an analytical purpose in a civil action, rather than merely
expressing an unjustifiable judicial hostility to the plaintiff's substantive cause
of action, then it must function as a heightened pleading or proof requirement.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has expressly repudiated the
efforts of lower federal courts to impose heightened pleading or proof
requirements on disfavored civil claims, including those brought pursuant to §
1221983. A § 1983 plaintiff prevails at the summary judgment stage of the civil
action unless "no genuine issue as to any material fact" exists and the defendant
is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." '123 In Crawford-El v. Britton,124 the
Supreme Court expressly held that a court may not impose any heightened
proof requirement in civil actions brought pursuant to § 1983.125 The
substantial preliminary showing requirement is simply inapplicable to civil
actions challenging the truthfulness of affidavits underlying search warrants.
B. The Informant Privilege
Some lower federal courts have also inappropriately elevated the
government's informant privilege into an unassailable obstacle for a criminal
defendant. These courts have concluded that the defendant has not satisfied the
substantial preliminary showing requirement, even if the warrant affidavit
undermine conviction). But see Beck v. City of Muskogee, 195 F.3d 553, 588 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (interpreting
footnote 7 of Heck to allow § 1983 suits regarding the search leading to arrest and/or conviction). In any event,
as a practical matter, a § 1983 claim would not be worth pursuing if the search was successful. See Hector v.
Watt, 235 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001); Townes v. City of New York. 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The evil
of an unreasonable search or seizure is that it invades privacy, not that it uncovers crime, which is no evil at
all.").
121. See 3 KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 103.11 (5th ed. 2000). In federal courts, the standard jury instruction reads: "This case should
be considered and decided by you as a dispute between persons of equal standing in the community, of equal
worth, and holding the same or similar stations in life. All persons stand equal before the law and are to be
treated as equals." Id.
122. See, e.g, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 594 (1998); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993). Those cases, applying the substantial preliminary showing requirement to civil § 1983 actions,
were either decided prior to Swierkiewicz and Crawford-El or simply failed to consider their import. See supra
note 118 (citing cases).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 243 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153 (1970).
124. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
125. Seeid.at594.
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contains a material falsehood, absent proof that the law enforcement affiant
made the falsehood and not the alleged confidential informant.' 26  The lower
courts correctly hold that only an intentionally or recklessly false statement in a
warrant affidavit by a law enforcement officer, not by a non-governmental
confidential informant, violates the Fourth Amendment.' 27  This position,
however, ignores the fact that if the alleged falsehood in the affidavit
sufficiently satisfies the substantial preliminary showing requirement, then the
very purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to determine the source responsible
for that falsehood.
128
Further, assessing legal culpability is more complex than simply an either/or
determination of the original source of the perjurious falsehood in the affidavit.
Even if the confidential informant is the original source of the perjurious
falsehood, an evidentiary hearing remains necessary to resolve the factual issue
of whether the law enforcement affiant had knowledge of or recklessly
disregarded the informant's false statement, or wrongfully vouched for the
informant's reliability, veracity, or basis of knowledge.' 29  An evidentiary
hearing does not necessarily require the disclosure of the informant's identity to
the defendant or her counsel. At an evidentiary hearing, the court possesses
many tools to assist in making accurate and just factual conclusions without
jeopardizing the informant's identity, including cross-examination of the law
enforcement affiant and production of the confidential informant for in camera
examination by the court.
130
While an evidentiary hearing does not necessarily entail the compelled
disclosure of the informant's identity, the question remains whether a criminal
defendant may be entitled to such disclosure once he establishes a substantial
126. See generally United States v. Rodnguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Brown, 3 F.3d 673 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Schauble, 647 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1981).
127. See, e.g., Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1964) (holding warrant valid where
statements were not made by affiant); United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711, 714 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing
multiple federal case decisions); State v. Glenn, 740 A.2d 856, 861 (Conn. 1999) (citing multiple state case
decisions). On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment is violated if the intentionally or recklessly false
statement is made by a law enforcement officer and then relied upon, even if innocently, by the police officer
affiant. See, eg, United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kennedy, 131
F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997); Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 448 (5th Cir. 1997). Even if the person
providing the false information to the affiant is a private citizen, the Fourth Amendment may still be violated if
he or she is "in fact acting as a government agent." United States v. Hollis, 245 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2001),
see also United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417-19 (7th Cir. 1994); State v. Thetford, 745 P.2d 496,
496 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
128. See generally United States v. Kiser, 716 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Lucente, 506 N.E.2d
1269 (I1. 1987); State v. Wolken, 700 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1985) (en banc).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Roth, 201
F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2000); Brown, 3 F.3d at 677-78.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding no abuse of discretion of
lower court not conducting in camera review); United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 477 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding the power to conduct in camera review of confidential informant within lower court's discretion);
Kiser, 716 F 2d at 1273-74 (remanding for in camera review of affiant and questioning of local police officers).
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preliminary showing of falsehood contained within the warrant. The Supreme
Court addressed this question prior to Franks, in McCray v. Illinois.131  In
McCray, the Court held that, even in the context of a suppression hearing in a
criminal case, the government's informant privilege is not absolute and the
decision whether to recognize the privilege remains in the sound discretion of
the trial court.132 The judiciary acknowledges that "[b]y definition[,] criminal
informants are cut from untrustworthy cloth."' 133 Nevertheless, many courts fail
to exercise the sound discretion contemplated by the Supreme Court in
McCray. When the criminal defendant independently discovers the identity of
the informant, courts routinely approve of the law enforcement affiant's
affirmative misrepresentation of the informant's reliability. 134  Lower courts
have even endorsed the common police practice of manufacturing reliability by
characterizing anonymous callers and first-time informants as persons who
have "not given false information in the past."'
135
The reluctance of the courts to require disclosure of a confidential informant
in an appropriate case, or at least to ensure the truthfulness of the law
enforcement affiant's representation of the informant's reliability, is entirely
the product of the practicalities of the criminal justice system. Aside from the
fact that the criminal process encourages the misuse of preliminary motions by
defendants for ulterior purposes, the reality is that "[t]he very purpose of a
motion to suppress is to escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand."'
136
The government's informant privilege will rarely, if ever, be an appropriate
obstacle to a § 1983 plaintiffs ability to remedy an alleged Franks violation of
the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
evidentiary privileges must be strictly construed for the simple reason that
131. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
132. Id. at 307-08 (noting judge may request production ofinfomant if he deems it necessary).
133. United States v. Bemal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Anty, 203
F.3d 305, 311-12 (4th Cir 2000); Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985). See
generally Aaron M. Clemens. Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to Prevent Unjust
Convictions, 23 QUINNIPIAC. L. REv. 151 (2004).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding omission of "reliable"
informant's three previous felony convictions and fact he was "under the influence of methamphetamine at the
time he gave the information" did not necessitate Franks hearing); United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117,
1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding lower court's decision denying suppression motion where affidavit omitted
times informant had perjured himself); United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1553-54 (9th Cir. 1995)
(affidavit upheld where affiant knew informant's desire to collect $100,000 award, his documented
commitment to mental institutions, and legal history for dishonest crimes). But see, e.g., United States v.
Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 774 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding district court's determination of officer's reckless
misrepresentation of informant's credibility); United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565, 573 (lst Cir. 1999)
(noting affiant's omission of informant's long criminal record, numerous aliases, and recent plea bargain
agreement); United States v. Hall, 113 F.3d 157, 160-61 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing FBI's knowledge of, and
failure to disclose, information that impugned informant).
135. United States v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Underwood,
364 F.3d 956, 964 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1997).
136. McCray, 386 U.S. at 306-07 (quoting State v. Burnett, 201 A.2d 39,44 (N.J. 1964)).
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"they are in derogation of the search for truth."' 137 In a civil action, where the
law enforcement officer defends against a claim of a constitutional violation,
any assertion of an informant's privilege to prevent disclosure of relevant
evidence must be treated with special disfavor.' 38  In McCray, the Supreme
Court sharply distinguished the assertion of the privilege at a suppression
hearing from the entirely different context of a criminal trial. 139  When the
government attempts to assert the informant's privilege during a criminal trial,
in order to keep relevant information out of the hands of the trier of fact,
success is far from absolute. As the Supreme Court explains, "Where the
disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege must give way."' 140  In a § 1983 civil
action, the defendant affiant cannot assert the informant's privilege precisely
because disclosure is necessary to achieve a fair resolution of the merits of the
plaintiffs claim. "If [the law enforcement affiant] did not have an informant,
or his informant did not provide the information contained in the affidavit, or
the informant was unreliable, the validity of the warrant would be in jeopardy
and plaintiffs Fourth Amendment violation claims would be strengthened.'
14 1
In those rare, truly extraordinary civil cases, in which the government can
demonstrate a particularized compelling need for confidentiality, the trial court
has ample authority to accommodate all of the parties under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, including the use of protective orders.
142
137. United States v. Nixon, 418 U S. 683, 710 (1974); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S 40
(1980); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1974)
138. See, e.g., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 638 (7th Cir. 1979), Skibo v. City of New York, 109
F.R.D. 58, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Socialist Workers Party v Attorney General, 458 F. Supp. 895, 899 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), rev d in part sub nom, In re Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1979).
139. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U S. 300, 309-11 (1967) (noting strength of informant's privilege weaker at
trial where issue is of guilt or innocence).
140. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
141 Hampton, 600 F.2d at 636; see also Rovzaro, 353 U.S. at 64-65. Rovario represented "a case where
the Government's informer was the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged ...
[U]nder these circumstances, the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the government to
withhold the identity .... Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64-65. In a civil § 1983 action, the law enforcement officer,
now a defendant, often seeks to rely on information allegedly received from a confidential informant to prove
the truthfulness of the challenged statements contained in the search warrant affidavit. In such situations, the
court cannot permit the law enforcement officer to testify concerning the existence or reliability of the
informant while, at the same time, assert a privilege to avoid disclosure of the identity of that informant. Cf
Desai v. Hersh, 954 F.2d 1408, 1412 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to uphold reporter's privilege in defamation
action, where privilege would effectively make establishing prima facie case impossible); Laxalt v.
McClathchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 452-53 (D. Nev. 1987) (holding reporter must refuse to answer question of
reliability at trial if he wishes to keep source confidential); Dowd v. Calabrese, 577 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D.D.C.
1983) (concluding defendant could retain confidentiality of its sources but had to forgo reliance on those
sources for its defense).
142. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-99 (1998) (noting availability of several procedures for
trial judge to reduce burden on any party).
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VI. "RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE TRUTH"
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to establish a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence "that the false statement was included in the
affidavit by the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard
for the truth."' 43 The federal courts of appeals have generally concluded that
"[t]he Supreme Court in 'Franks gave no guidance concerning what constitutes
a reckless disregard for the truth in fourth amendment cases, except to state that
"negligence or innocent mistake [is] insufficient .... 1 44  On the basis of this
erroneous premise, 145 these federal courts of appeals have either abdicated their
responsibility to locate the meaning of the phrase "reckless disregard for the
truth" within the Fourth Amendment or developed an interpretation
inconsistent with Fourth Amendment values.
A. The Inappropriate Analogy to First Amendment Doctrine
The federal courts of appeals erroneously borrow their definition of
"reckless disregard for the truth" from the Supreme Court's definition of actual
malice in its First Amendment jurisprudence. 146 In this regard, the Supreme
Court held in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan147 that a public official or public
figure cannot recover damages for defamatory statements absent proof that the
speaker made the statement with actual malice. 148 Actual malice means that the
allegedly defamatory statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 149 In other words, the
First Amendment prohibits the imposition of liability under the actual malice
standard, absent proof that the statement was made "with a 'high degree of
awareness of [its] probable falsity." ' 150
The federal courts of appeals have imported this First Amendment definition
143. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
144. United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781,
787 (3d Cir. 2000)).
145. See infra Part VI.B.
146. See, e.g, United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 800-01 (8th Cir. 1995); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d
618, 621-22 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984).
147. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
148. See id at 270 (explaining public officials expected to be verbally attacked during public debates);
Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging showing of
malice requirement exists for public figure as it exists for public official). The Supreme Court has emphasized
the limited nature of the public figure category. See generally, e g, Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 11
(1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Furthermore, a plaintiff need not prove actual malice, or even negligence, if the allegedly defamatory statement
does not involve a matter of public concern. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 757-
58 (1985).
149. New York Times, 376 U.S at 280.
150. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964)).
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of reckless disregard for the truth into its Fourth Amendment analysis of
perjured warrant affidavits. In the First Amendment context of confidential
informants, reckless disregard for the truth means that the law officer affiant
had "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of
his reports" or "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the
statement.' 5' Lower courts imported this heightened standard into the Fourth
Amendment and held that no Franks violation exists absent proof that the law
enforcement affiant had "obvious reasons to doubt the truth" of the statement(s)
in the warrant affidavit. 152 In doing so, the courts have offered no rationale
other than the unhappy coincidence that the Supreme Court used the same
phrase of "reckless disregard for the truth" in Franks that it had previously used
in Sullivan.
Upon analysis, the Sullivan Court's "reckless disregard for the truth"
standard is entirely inconsistent with the important Fourth Amendment
principles that Franks sought to protect. The First Amendment freedom of
speech clause preserves the free, democratic character of our society by
guaranteeing the right of ordinary persons, and their media representatives, to
engage in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ... debate on public issues."
' 153
The Supreme Court has recognized the inevitability of exaggerations,
distortions, vilifications, falsehoods, mischaracterizations, and unsupported
conclusory statements in the public discussion of public persons and public
affairs by which a free people governs itself in a democracy. 154 Under the First
Amendment, the reckless disregard standard seeks to prevent government
officials, as well as those who wield great power and influence, from enlisting
the coercive power of the government to silence their critics except in
extraordinary cases. 155
The Fourth Amendment is also intended to protect the people from the
tyranny of the government. Here, however, the warrant clause guarantees
individual freedom and security by prohibiting government agents from
forcibly invading the sanctity of a person's home. Absent both probable cause
and a valid warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, based on the
demonstration of sufficient specific facts, and sworn to under oath by the law
enforcement officer, the government has no right to breach one's individual
security. The neutral and detached magistrate must then draw the independent
151 Id. at 731-32
152 See, eg., United States v Yusuf. 461 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2006); Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405
F.3d 66, 81 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also supra note
146 (detailing reckless disregard of the truth standard).
153 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The
New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191
(1964).
154 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270
155 See id. at 270-72; see also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S 279, 291 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Pub.
Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1970); Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940).
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conclusion that the invasion is justified. 156 Under the Fourth Amendment, there
exists no countervailing value in exaggerations, distortions, vilifications,
mischaracterizations, unsupported conclusory statements, or even reckless
falsehoods. These exemplify poor, sloppy police work that threaten the
security and liberty of law-abiding citizens and should therefore be minimized
as much as possible.
Contrasting standards of proof and appellate review reflect the differing
meaning of the term "reckless disregard for the truth" under the First and
Fourth Amendments. In First Amendment jurisprudence, a party must prove
reckless disregard by clear and convincing evidence. An appellate court then
applies de novo review to the trial judge's determination in order to ensure the
protection of the private individual from the coercive power of the
government. 157 On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment protects individual
liberty by treating reckless disregard as a pure question of fact, provable by a
preponderance of the evidence, and only subject to appellate review for clear
158
error.
Substantive First Amendment interpretations of the reckless disregard for the
truth standard are also directly contrary to established Fourth Amendment
doctrine. One important purpose of the reckless disregard standard is to protect
the right of private speakers to make broad, conclusory general statements and
even adopt "one of a number of possible rational interpretations" of an
ambiguous event.' 59 In contrast, bedrock Fourth Amendment doctrine dictates
that under the warrant clause, the law enforcement affiant must accurately
report the specific facts. Only the neutral and detached magistrate may draw
any inferences or conclusions from the facts contained in the warrant affidavit.
A warrant based on the mere conclusions or interpretations of the events by the
law enforcement officer is clearly invalid. 160 Indeed, a law enforcement officer
who conducts a search on the basis of such a warrant cannot even claim the
benefit of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.' 61 While under
First Amendment principles, the reckless disregard standard seeks to free
public debate from the rigid standards of provable truthfulness which govern
testimony given in a legal proceeding, a warrant affidavit is a legal document,
the truthfulness of which is sworn to under oath by the affiant.' 62 Allowing a
156. See supra Part III.A (explaining role of neutral and detached magistrate).
157. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 492 (1984); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 732-33 (1968); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
158. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700 (1996); United States v. Awadallah, 349
F.3d 43, 65 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Elliott, 322 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 2003).
159. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 512 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971)); see also Bresler,
398 U.S. at 6; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-288 (1964).
160. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113 (1964);
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
161. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915, 923 (1984).
162 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 278-79.
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law enforcement officer to swear to the truth of a fact simply because she did
not have a "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity" would make a
mockery of the very purpose of the Fourth Amendment.'
63
Even the Supreme Court has recognized that its First Amendment standard
"puts a premium on ignorance. ' 64  Under the First Amendment, a publisher
has no duty to investigate before making a defamatory statement about a public
official or public figure. 165  Whatever the wisdom of tolerating ignorance in
First Amendment jurisprudence, it is certainly terrible public policy to accept
statements made in ignorance by trained law enforcement officers. The
obligation of a person swearing an oath to tell the truth is entirely different
from remarks made in the public discourse.
Most fundamentally, the First Amendment reckless disregard standard
directly contradicts both the text and any rational interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. Unlike the First Amendment, which operates to prohibit certain
government actions, the Fourth Amendment imposes an affirmative obligation
on the government, including its law enforcement officers, not to invade the
security of individuals and their homes absent the demonstrated existence of
probable cause. Contrary to First Amendment doctrine, a Fourth Amendment
duty to investigate is widely accepted in the case law.' 66  Under the First
Amendment a publisher has no duty to ascertain the reliability, veracity, or
accuracy of an informant or of the information received. A finding of reckless
disregard for the truth requires proof that the publisher had "obvious reasons to
doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports."' 67  In
contrast, the Fourth Amendment requires the warrant affidavit to establish facts
sufficient to demonstrate the reliability, credibility, and veracity of the
informant in the absence of other evidence of probable cause.'
68
B. A Return to the Language of the Fourth Amendment
Rather than employing First Amendment jurisprudence to define the reckless
163. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964)).
164. Id. at 731.
165. See id. at 732-33; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964) (explaining
undercover investigations and sting operations rely on falsehoods and deception for success).
166. See Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (explaining "law enforcement officers have a
duty to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation prior to arresting a suspect .... "); see also Cortez v.
McCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 990 (10th Cir. 2006); Somberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1014-15 (7th
Cir. 2006); Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004). Of course, a law enforcement
officer's duty to investigate is not limitless See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-147 (1979) (finding no
duty to investigate claim of innocence of person incarcerated on basis of properly issued arrest warrant).
167 St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
168. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983). Compare Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)
(anonymous tip providing no indicia of reliability or predictive information for the officers to corroborate), with
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (anonymous tip which informed officers of location, type of car
involved, time of movement, and presence of cocaine allowed officers to independently verify information).
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disregard standard in the Fourth Amendment context, courts should look
instead to the language of the Franks majority. There, the Supreme Court
explicitly stated that a false statement in a warrant affidavit exists when a law
enforcement officer affiant "knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth," makes a statement which is not "believed or
appropriately accepted by the affiant as true."'16 9  This Fourth Amendment
definition is virtually the polar opposite of the First Amendment standard of
statements published "with 'a high degree of awareness of [their] probable
falsity.''
'70
The Court in Franks also explained that it based its holding on the "oath or
affirmation" provision of the Fourth Amendment stating, "[W]e derive our
ground from the language of the Warrant Clause itself, which surely takes the
affiant's good faith as its premise: '[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation .. ,,,171 The oath or
affirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment deals not with the objective
accuracy of the warrant affidavit, but with the "integrity of the warrant,"
172
which in turn depends entirely on the subjective "state of mind of the
affiant.",1
73
The proper source of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the oath or
affirmation provision of the Fourth Amendment is not found in the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence. Instead, one finds its source in the law of
perjury. Under the law of perjury, "when one makes an unqualified statement
of a fact as true which he does not know to be true,. . . such unqualified
statement will itself constitute perjury."' 174 Under the Fourth Amendment, as
under the law of perjury, when a law enforcement officer swears an oath, she
must know or believe that the contents of the affidavit are actually true, not
merely that there is "a possibility that they might be true."
' 17 5
169. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978).
170. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964)).
171. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164 (quoting U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.); see also Rugendorf v. United States, 376
U.S. 528, 533 (1964).
172. Rugendorf 376 U.S. at 532; see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-65.
173. State v. Anderson, 406 N.W.2d 398, 404 (Wis. 1987); see also United States v. Cican, 63 F. App'x
832, 835-37 (6th Cir. 2003); Turner v. Lotspeich, No. 95-1063, 1996 WL 23195, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 23,
1996); United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1984).
174. People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130, 143 (Cal. 1978) (en banc) (quoting People v. Von Tiedeman, 52 P.2d
155, 158 (Cal. 1898)); see also Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973); Butler v. State, 429
S.W 2d 497, 502 (Tex. Cnm. App. 1968).
175. State v. Claxton, 594 P.2d 112, 114 (Ariz. App. 1979); see also Cook, 583 P.2d at 143;
Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred and Ninety-Two Dollars, 422 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Mass. 1981); State v. Little,
560 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tenn. 1978). In Olson v. Tyler, the court, believing that qualified immunity required an
objective standard, stated the test as whether the information in the affidavit "was not reasonably believed by
defendants to be true." 771 F.2d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 1985). In Crawford-El v. Britton, the Supreme Court
rejected the notion that objective reasonableness will immunize a government official when the constitutional
violation is one based on subjective intent. 523 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1998). In Mason v. Lowndes County
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In every area of the law, including perjury, 176 a person's subjective state of
mind, including knowledge, belief, and intent, is a pure issue of fact for the trier
of fact to resolve. 177  This is proper because such questions depend on
"[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts," all of which ordinarily lie within the
exclusive province of the trier of fact. 
178
VII. PROBABLE CAUSE AND PERJURED AFFIDAVITS
In Franks, the Supreme Court held that in addition to proving that a warrant
affidavit contains one or more intentionally or recklessly false statements, the
individual challenging the warrant also must establish that, "with the affidavit's
false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to
establish probable cause" in order to suppress the evidence obtained as a result
of the warrant. 179  In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has explained that
neither the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule nor the immunity
doctrines, which ordinarily protect law enforcement officers from liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are applicable if a warrant affidavit contains perjurious
statements. Thus, the remainder of the affidavit must establish actual, not
merely arguable, probable cause. This probable cause determination is an issue
of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. Unfortunately, the federal courts of
appeals have subverted these doctrinal principles.
Sheriff's Dep "t, 106 F. App'x 203, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth Circuit added that a § 1983 plaintiff must
also prove that the law enforcement affiant engaged in a "deliberate attempt to mislead the magistrate judge" as
to the existence of probable cause. Every other court to consider the issue properly rejected this additional
element. See, e.g., Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565,
572-73 n.8 (Ist Cir. 1999); Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme
Court also rejected this additional element in its construction of the federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621.
See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973). Mason inappropriately ignores the fact that affiants
may make falsehoods recklessly; "even if they involve minor details-recklessness is measured not by the
relevance of the information, but by the demonstration of willingness to affirmatively distort the truth." Mason,
106 F. App'x at 207 (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)).
176. See, e.g., Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359; United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1294-96 (11th Cir.
2006); United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2004).
177. See, e.g, Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 589; United States Postal Service Bd. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
716-17 (1983) ("The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion." (quoting Eddington
v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch D. 459, 483 (1885))); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) ("Treating
issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace"); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 289 (1960).
178. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
179. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).
180. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding no good faith exception to exclusionary
rule where affidavits contain perjurious statements); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004)
(reasoning no qualified immunity if good faith exception not applicable); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118
(1997) (finding no absolute immunity in § 1983 suits for prosecutor who certified an affidavit containing
perjurious statements).
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A. The Flawed "Corrected Affidavits "Approach
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with no stated rationale for its
deviation from Franks, has adopted what it calls a "corrected affidavits
doctrine."'' 8 1 Pursuant to this doctrine, the Second Circuit "examine[s] all of
the information the officers possessed when they applied for the.
warrant.' 182  Most of the other federal courts of appeals have rejected the
Second Circuit's mode of analysis.'
83
As a practical matter, the "corrected affidavits doctrine" proposes that courts
should embark on an unpromising factual quest to determine what information
the law enforcement affiant knew or believed to be true at the time they
subscribed the warrant affidavit. 84  The doctrine proceeds on the dubious
premise that the law enforcement affiant deliberately chose to omit truthful
information known at the time and instead inserted intentional or reckless
falsehoods into the affidavit. The more likely scenario is that a law
enforcement officer willing to commit perjury in a sworn affidavit will have
little reluctance to fabricate these omitted facts when questioned later.'
85
Indeed, the Second Circuit's "corrected affidavits approach" encourages
police officers to file intentionally or recklessly false warrant affidavits because
they can never end in a worse situation for doing so. Law enforcement
affiants' intentional or reckless falsehoods serve only one conceivable purpose:
securing the issuance of a warrant, which the magistrate might otherwise have
denied. The police officer knows that a defendant might never challenge the
affidavit, but if she does, a successful search will place the facts allegedly
known earlier in a more favorable light at the subsequent suppression hearing.
Thus, the "corrected affidavits approach" "not only. . . infus[es] extraneous
information into the probable cause determination, but. . . also allow[s] the
181. Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004).
182. Id. at 744; see also Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (2d Cir. 2002); Martinez v. City of
Schenectady, 115 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit originated its "corrected affidavits
doctrine" in cases involving claims of omissions of exculpatory information in warrant affidavits. See
Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743-44; Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cit. 1999); Soares v. Connecticut, 8
F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993). In Smith and Soares, the Second Circuit responded to the claim of an omission of
exculpatory information in the affidavit by "correcting" the affidavit through the insertion of the omitted
exculpatory information, not by adding inculpatory information. Smith, 175 F.3d at 105; Soares, 8 F.3d at 920.
183. See, e.g, Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting information not
provided in affidavit to original magistrate making probable cause determination); United States v. Hams, 464
F.3d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 2006) (limiting consideration of exculpatory information only in affidavit review);
United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 388-89, 388 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006) (limiting probable cause determination
to information contained in affidavit).
184. See Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743-44. But see United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 751-52 (6th Cir.
2005) (identifying difficulties arising from subjective inquiry into officer's knowledge outside four comers of
affidavit).
185. The problem of police perjury in suppression hearings is well documented. See supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
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Government to receive the benefit of its misconduct.'
86
The Second Circuit's "corrected affidavits doctrine" is also fatally flawed as
a matter of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The extraneous information
offered in later testimony does not, and does not even attempt to, make the false
statements in the affidavit truthful. Thus, in no way does the extraneous
information correct or retroactively cure the invalidity of the warrant. It is
fundamental doctrine that the Fourth Amendment requires both probable cause
and a valid warrant.187 The fact that the police officer could have obtained a
valid warrant never excuses the failure to have done so. 188  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has held that "an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be
rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed by the affiant
when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate...
[because a] contrary rule would, of course, render the warrant requirements of
the Fourth Amendment meaningless."
'1 89
The United States Supreme Court correctly held in Franks that once a
warrant affidavit is found to contain intentionally or recklessly false statements
of fact, those falsehoods must be redacted. The decision of whether to suppress
the evidence found in the resulting search must be based solely on the
"remaining content" of the affidavit. 9  Judicial consideration of any
information not contained in the original affidavit runs contrary to both the
requirement of ex ante review by a neutral and detached magistrate as well as
the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
191
186. Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 388 n.12.
187. See, e.g, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 n.25 (1980); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
32 (1925) ("The search of a pnvate dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our
laws").
188. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1971) (citing Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20,33 (1925)).
189. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971) (citing Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 109 n.l (1964)); see also Agnello, 269 U.S. at 33.
190. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).
191. The probable cause test as set forth in Gates requires that the magistrate base his determination of
probable cause on the "totality of circumstances" set forth in the affidavit. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230
(1983). Gates presupposes that the underlying affidavit sets forth all the facts comprising the totality of the
circumstances then known to the affiant. In contrast, the "corrected affidavits doctrine" affirmatively
encourages law enforcement affiants to omit known, relevant information from the affidavit by permitting the
later supplementation of the affidavit with after-the-fact testimony. See Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743
(2d Cir. 2004). Judicial acceptance of a police policy or practice of omitting important, usually exculpatory,
information from warrant affidavits institutionalizes the issuance of warrants by magistrates who never know
the totality of the circumstances as required by Gates. See, e.g., Golino v. City of New Hower, 950 F.2d 864,
867 (2d Cir. 1991) (police affiant testified it was his general practice to omit exculpatory information from
affidavit); Salmon v. Schwarz, 948 F.2d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 1991) (police practice to include only
information pertinent to objective of securing warrant and not exculpatory information); Forest v. Pawtucket
Police Dep't, 290 F. Supp. 2d 215, 229 (D. R.I. 2003) (same).
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B. Actual Versus Arguable Probable Cause
The federal courts of appeals have found especially troublesome the
question of whether the remainder of the warrant affidavit must establish
actual, or merely arguable, probable cause. Some courts have erroneously
permitted arguable probable cause to validate a warrant affidavit containing one
or more perjurious statements by holding that no Franks violation exists unless
a magistrate "could not have found probable cause" on the basis of the truthful
remainder of the affidavit. 192 The use of this test for evaluating the truthful
remainder of the affidavit has the untoward effect of encouraging police
perjury. The judge conducts the later review of the affidavit under a more
lenient standard than that applied by the original magistrate who initially
determined whether actual probable cause existed in the affidavit.
The proper standard a court should apply, once it has determined that a
warrant affidavit contains intentionally or recklessly false statements, is actual
probable cause. The fact-finder steps into the role of the original magistrate
and simply repeats the probable cause inquiry. The reviewing judge should not
give any deference to the magistrate's prior determination for the fundamental
reason that the magistrate never reviewed the untainted facts. 19 3  In other
words, the fact-finder "cannot defer to a magistrate's consideration of an
application for a search warrant that the magistrate in effect did not review."
194
Any standard less than de novo review is inappropriate because the original
magistrate was unaware of the affiant's perjury and therefore could not make
an informed determination of the affiant's credibility. 195 Stated another way,
the issue is whether "[t]he force of the lies on the mind of the magistrate can be
bleached out." 
196
Much of the confusion surrounding the subsequent determination of whether
probable cause exists is due to the failure of courts and commentators to
analyze its proper role in constitutional jurisprudence. The presence of
probable cause in the truthful remainder of an affidavit does not negate the fact
that perjured affidavits violate the Fourth Amendment. Even when probable
cause is present, "[t]he search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself
unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws."'
197
192. United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1554 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also United States
v. Mindreci, 163 F. App'x 690, 693 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding warrant if "magistrate had a substantial basis
for concluding that the probable cause existed") (citation omitted); United States v. Perdomo, 800 F.2d 916,
920 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding warrant unless falsehood "necessary to find probable cause").
193. See, e.g., Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F 3d 66, 82 (ist Cir. 2005); United States v. Kolodziej, 712
F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Namer, 680 F.2d 1088, 1095 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding no
presumption of validity attaches to original magistrate's probable cause determination).
194. State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556, 559 (Mont. 1998).
195. See People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130, 140-41 (Cal. 1978).
196. Baldwin v. Placer County, 418 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2005).
197. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,32 (1925); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88
(1980) (discussing warrantless search of defendant's home and associated Fourth Amendment violation).
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When the warrant affidavit contains perjurious statements, one cannot fairly
say that the magistrate ever determined ex ante the sufficiency of the remaining
content. Rather, the magistrate based her ex ante determination on the totality
of the facts and circumstances set forth in the original affidavit, not on the basis
of some then-unspecified portion of that affidavit. 198 The Fourth Amendment
violation inherent in any warrant based on a perjured affidavit is not a merely
technical one because "[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the
question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause .... 99
The foregoing paragraphs suggest the correct answer to the question of the
proper role of probable cause in the Franks analysis. The probable cause issue
in Franks should be framed not as a question of whether a Fourth Amendment
violation occurred, but whether the law should grant a remedy for such a
violation. As the Supreme Court held in Hudson v. Michigan,20 0 "[wihether the
exclusionary remedy is appropriately imposed in a particular case. . . is 'an
issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the
party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct."' 20 1 The
Hudson Court reasoned that the remedy of exclusion is only appropriate when
the Fourth Amendment violation has caused constitutionally cognizable
202harm. Thus, probable cause in this context is a causation issue.
Causation's centrality to the exclusionary remedy's existence and scope
explains both the Supreme Court's "independent source" doctrine20 3 and its
close relative, the "inevitable discovery" rule.20 4  Both doctrines have their
foundation in the causal distinction identified by Justice Holmes as
"knowledge ... gained from an independent source," which is not subject to
exclusion, and "knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong," which is
not admissible in a criminal proceeding. 205  The probable cause element of
Franks is simply an application of the "independent source" doctrine. In
Franks, the truthful content of the original warrant affidavit, which remains
after redaction of the intentional or reckless falsehoods, constitutes the asserted
"independent source." If the magistrate would have issued the requested
warrant solely on the basis of the truthful content of the affidavit, then, under
198. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
199. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
200. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
201. Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984), Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
223 (1983)).
202. Id at 591-93. The Court was unanimous on this point. See id at 602-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); id. at 614-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (accepting causation standard but
disagreeing as to its proper application). The majority opinion treats pragmatic concerns as a separate
consideration as to whether the exclusionary remedy should be applied Id. at 593-99 (majority opinion). The
issue whether pragmatic concerns are a separate consideration or encompassed within a proper causation
analysis is much more difficult and controversial.
203. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537-39 (1988).
204. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984).
205. Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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the "independent source" doctrine, no causal connection exists between the
intentional or reckless falsehoods in the affidavit and the issuance of the
warrant by the magistrate.
20 6
Similarly, causation is an essential element of any civil action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation.20 7  In order to
establish liability, the civil plaintiff must prove that the presence of the
intentional or reckless falsehoods in the affidavit was a "substantial" or
"motivating factor" in the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant. 21 Courts
also routinely use this standard of causation in analogous areas of the law. For
example, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,209 the Supreme Court stated
the test of materiality for actionable omissions from proxy statements as
follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.... It does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the
standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under
all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance
in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.
210
This causation standard is also analogous to the materiality test used to
determine criminal liability for perjury. A person commits perjury if she makes
an intentionally or recklessly false statement under oath that has "a natural
tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the
decision making body to which it was addressed., 2 11  In order to sustain a
conviction for perjury, the prosecution need not prove "that the perjured
testimony actually influenced the relevant decision-making body."212  Thus,
206. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 537-39. The causation-based "independent source" doctrine does not, under
any circumstances, excuse the absence of a warrant when one is required by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Indeed, in Hudson, all Justices agreed on the necessity of a warrant to justify the police invasion. Unlike the
majority, which distinguished the knock-and-announce violation from the warrant itself, the dissent viewed the
violation of the knock-and-announce requirement as a factor which voided the warrant itself. Compare Hudson,
547 U.S. at 600 (majority opinion), with id. at 614 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This further explains why the
"remaining content" constituting the "independent source" must be contained within the original warrant
affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).
207. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 n.7 (1986); Baker v. MeCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979).
208. Cf Mt. Healthy Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see also Texas v. Lesage, 528
U.S. 18, 22 (1999); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 (1998).
209. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
210. Id. at 449.
211. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759,
770 (1988)) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
212. United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759, 771 (1988) (explaining materiality test for misrepresentation and concealment); United States v. Ronda,
455 F.3d 1273, 1295 n.29 (I Ith Cir. 2006) (deeming false statement sufficiently material because capable of
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such a standard of causation, founded on whether an intentionally or recklessly
false statement in a warrant affidavit materially affected the magistrate's
determination of probable cause, would result in a violation of the Fourth
Amendment only when the law enforcement officer committed the crime of
perjury. One cannot persuasively argue that this standard, textually grounded
in the "oath or affirmation" provision of the Fourth Amendment warrant clause,
over-protects fundamental constitutional values. Nor is such a causation
standard insensitive to the legitimate needs of law enforcement because it fully
protects all police affiants, except those who rightfully should be imprisoned.
The Supreme Court has granted governmental defendants in § 1983 actions
the added benefit of an affirmative defense whereby they may "defeat liability
by demonstrating that [the magistrate] would have made the same decision
absent the forbidden consideration." 2 13  Thus, under the Supreme Court's
causation doctrine, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action may only succeed if the
magistrate would not have issued the requested warrant based solely on the
remaining content of the affidavit.2 14  The trier of fact must resolve this
causation issue.
215
This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Hartman v. Moore,2 16 in which the Court held that where a prosecutor and
grand jury continue a criminal prosecution based on truthful information from
law enforcement officers, probable cause serves as a surrogate for proof of
causation. 217  Although Hartman is distinguishable precisely because the
information provided by the law enforcement officers was entirely truthful, its
significance is three-fold. 2 18 First, it recognizes that probable cause constitutes
influencing tribunal).
213. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21; see Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593 (noting employer prevails if
constitutional violation determinative in decision): Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (criticizing lower court for not
analyzing if absence of protected conduct determinative in decision).
214. Some courts of appeals have applied this causation standard in § 1983 cases based on an alleged
Franks violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Mason v. Lowndes County Sheriffs Dep't, 106 F.
App'x 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating after plaintiff proves intentional or reckless falsity, the fact-finder
decides whether it is determinative); Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 574 & n.l (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining
magistrate must have found probable cause based on truthful information to be valid); Hill v. McIntyre, 884
F.2d 271, 275-76 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting jury determines whether false statement determinative in issuance of
warrant); see also Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 1997) (analyzing whether plaintiff
would have been released on bond absent false statements by law enforcement officer).
215 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 602-03 (6th Cir. 2003); Baldasrare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d
188, 195 (3d Cir. 2001); Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 1998). Similarly, in the
common law of torts, causation is held to be "peculiarly a question for the jury." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264-65 (5th ed. 1984).
216. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
217. Id. at258-65.
218. See id. at 255-56 (assuming truthfulness of information provided by officials). When the information
provided by the law enforcement officer contains intentional or reckless falsehoods, the chain of causation is
broken and no deference is due to the prosecutor, grand jury, or judge in the underlying criminal case. See
generally, e.g., Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004); Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138
(2d Cir. 1999); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
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a causation, rather than a Fourth Amendment, issue. Second, Hartman treated
the relevant standard as actual, not merely arguable, probable cause.219 Finally,
the Court recognized that when probable cause is used as a test of causation, it
is an issue of fact for the trier of fact to resolve.
220
Even prior to Hartman, lower courts generally agreed that in civil cases
asserting Franks claims, a jury should decide the issue of causation or probable
cause. 221 This is the case even if the underlying facts are not in dispute and the
222issue is whether the facts constitute probable cause. While this latter inquiry
is technically a mixed question of law and fact, it is precisely the type of mixed
question, as in cases of negligence, 223 materiality in perjury,224 securities
fraud,225 and the issue of community standards in obscenity cases,226 which the
jury properly resolves. 227  The United States Supreme Court emphasized that
probable cause determinations, made in the first instance by lay magistrates, are
inherently issues of fact.228  Finally, it is significant, and perhaps dispositive,
that the framers of the Fourth Amendment never thought of probable cause as a
229technical legal concept. Instead, they intended that a jury would decide the
factual question of probable cause in each particular case.
230
219. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256-57 & n.5.
220. See id.
22 1. See, eg, Mason v. Lowndes County Sheriff's Dep't, 106 F. App'x 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2004); DeLoach
v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 623 (10th Cir. 1990); Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275-76 (6th Cir. 1989).
222. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 758-59 & n.14 (6th Cir. 2006); Velardi v.
Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 574 & n I (2d Cir. 1994); DeLoach, 922 F.2d at 623. But see Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721,
728-29 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding probable cause issue of law when underlying facts undisputed). Ornelas
provides no support for the unjustifiable result in Hale. Ornelas only decided the issue of the standard of
review in criminal cases, where probable cause is necessarily decided by judges. Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690, 697-
99 (1996). Furthermore, Ornelas emphasized the inherently factual nature of the inference of probable cause
from the facts at hand. Id. at 695-96, 699-700; see also id. at 700-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22.3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C (1965). Legal scholars have frequently noted the analogy
of probable cause to negligence, albeit without reference to the specific issue of the proper role of the jury in §
1983 cases. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 941 (1986); Craig S. Lemer,
The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 1014-15, 1019 (2003); Tracey Macin, The
Pnngle Case's New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re and the Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 395, 408 (2004).
224. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
225. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
226. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U S. 153, 157 (1974).
227. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521. Even in criminal cases, the jury must make any inference of probable
cause, except that in motions to suppress, judges make these determinations. Id
228. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
229 See Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble. The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 Miss. L.J. 279,
285 (2004) (citing David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739,
1792 (2000)).
230. See generally William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602-
1791 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with Claremont Graduate
School); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994).
[Vol. XLI:445
HeinOnline  -- 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 482 2007-2008
PERJURED AFFIDA VITS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
C. Qualified Immunity and Perjured Warrant Affidavits
There remains only the issue of whether a law enforcement officer who
violates the Fourth Amendment by filing a search or arrest warrant affidavit
containing one or more false statements of fact should be able to assert a
qualified immunity defense to avoid civil liability in a § 1983 action. As a
general rule, the qualified immunity doctrine protects a government official
from civil liability, absent the violation of a constitutional right which was
"clearly established" at the time.231 Under this standard, "[t]he contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.''232 This qualified immunity doctrine
is intended to protect all government officials except those who "are plainly
incompetent or knowingly violate the law."
233
Some courts, relying on the objective reasonableness standard, which
generally governs the issue of qualified immunity in § 1983 actions, 2" have
held that a law enforcement officer who files a perjurious warrant affidavit has
"obviously failed to observe a right that [is] clearly established," and, therefore,
"is not entitled to qualified immunity.' 235 In contrast, other federal appellate
courts have held that qualified immunity protects a police officer who violates
the Fourth Amendment by filing a perjurious warrant affidavit, so long as the
remainder of the affidavit is sufficient to establish arguable probable cause.
236
Properly understood, the objective reasonableness standard of qualified
immunity is entirely inapplicable when a law enforcement officer has violated
the Fourth Amendment by filing a warrant affidavit containing intentional or
reckless falsehoods. In Malley v. Briggs,237 the Supreme Court held that a
government official who "knowingly violate[s] the law" forfeits any claim to
qualified immunity without regard to the objective reasonableness standard. 238
231. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
232. Id. at 640.
233. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
234. See, e.g., Creighton, 483 U.S. at 64 1; Briggs, 475 U.S. at 339-41; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815 (1982).
235. Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1504 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Burke v. Town of Walpole, 403 F.3d
66, 82 (1st Cir. 2005); Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1997); Velardi v. Walsh,
40 F.3d 569, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1994). Indeed, some courts, strictly adhering to the objective reasonableness test,
ask whether a hypothetical reasonable officer would have known that the statement(s) in the affidavit was
(were) intentionally or recklessly false. See, e.g., Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1083 (11 th Cir. 2003),
Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 494-95 (8th Cir. 1991); Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1985).
For the reasons set forth herein, this mode of analysis is erroneous. See infra notes 237-242.
236. See, eg, Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743-45 (2d Cir. 2005); Martinez v. City of Schenectady,
115 F.3d 111, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1997); Smith v. Reddy, 101 F.3d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1996). In Kohler v. Englade,
470 F.3d 1104, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 2006), the Fifth Circuit reached a similar result by holding that Franks does
not apply to facially invalid warrants and then remanding to the lower court for a determination whether the
warrant contained arguable probable cause, thereby entitling the officer to qualified immunity under the Malley
v. Briggs objective reasonableness standard.
237. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
238. Id. at 341.
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Similarly, in Crawford-El v. Britton,239 the Court expressly rejected the
dissenting argument of Justice Scalia that the "'objective reasonableness' test
of Harlow [should be extended] to qualified immunity in so far as it relates to
intent-based constitutional torts., 24 0  Finally, the use of the objective
reasonableness standard to uphold perjurious warrants lacking actual, not
merely arguable, probable cause directly flies in the face of Supreme Court
precedent. In United States v. Leon, 24 1 the Court held "good faith" immunity
242inapplicable in cases where Franks has been violated. Whether a law
enforcement officer has filed a perjurious warrant affidavit depends entirely on
the knowledge and intent of that officer, and "should a fact-finder find against
an official on this state-of-mind question, qualified immunity would not be
available as a defense."
243
VIII. CONCLUSION
Today, Fourth Amendment issues are ordinarily subordinated to concerns
about the proper scope of the exclusionary rule as well as the role of qualified
immunity in constitutional adjudication. These mediating doctrines protect
dutiful and honest law enforcement officials who act in good faith and with
objective reasonableness. Neither doctrine was designed to protect dishonest
police officers who file perjurious warrant affidavits. Unfortunately, in the
absence of clear guidance from either the United States Supreme Court or legal
scholars, lower courts have erected inappropriate legal barriers to the
eradication of perjurious warrant affidavits.
Properly interpreted, Franks v. Delaware and other Supreme Court
precedent hold that a law enforcement officer violates the Fourth Amendment
when the trier of fact finds that the officer made intentionally or recklessly false
statements in a warrant affidavit. In such cases, the officer is not entitled to
benefit from the good faith doctrine or qualified immunity. The trier of fact
exclusively determines whether the truthful remainder of the affidavit
sufficiently establishes actual, not merely arguable, probable cause.
Unlike much of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this
interpretation approximates the Founding Father's original vision. 244 It offers
realistic protection from unjustified police intrusions into the home. It also
recognizes that intentionally or recklessly false statements in warrant affidavits
serve no legitimate law enforcement purpose. Rather, they are destructive of
239. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
240. Compare id. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting), with id. at 592-94 (majority opinion).
241. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
242. See id. 923, see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004) (asserting no qualified immunity
if good faith exception unavailable).
243. Butler v. Elie, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (2002); see also Mason v. Lowndes County Sheriffs Dept., 106
F. App'x 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2004); Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399-401 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1997).
244. See generally Amar, supra note 230.
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competent, professional police work. Finally, this interpretation recognizes that
false warrant affidavits constitute an "offense against the justice system '2 45
itself because "perjury tends to contaminate the very fountains of justice. '24 6
245. United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir. 1980).
246. Chappel v. State, 71 Ala. 322, 324 (1882).
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